Purpose: This study explores the development in Norway from an awareness of the need for numbers to govern in the 70s to a statistical information system launched in 2006, called IPLOS, to respond to this need. The article discuss how this system was developed, what the Norwegian authorities attempted to achieve with the development, which goals they desired and how the statistics was intended to contribute to reach them. Design/methodology/approach: This study has a multisite approach inspired by situational analysis, and draws on "governing by numbers" among other theoretical debates. It is based on original data (qualitative interviews) and secondary sources (policy and statistics development documents). The sources represent both top down and bottom up perspectives; authorities, municipalities, expertise involved in the development and disability activists. Findings: The statistics development expresses three challenges in Norwegian health and care service policy: planning and governance, the growing complexity of the welfare state and changing welfare ideologies.
Introduction
In 1919 the chief of Vital Statistics in Michigan, William Petrie (1919: 71) , spoke as follows to the American Public Health Association: "Vital statistics and public health administration may be termed a business proposition (…) Statistics, in brief, is a system of accounting (…) [and form] an indispensable part of the public health administration of all progressive cities, states and countries at the present". Today, Petries' call for acknowledging the usefulness of numbers for government has come to constitute a truism in two respects.
First, Western states have a long history of collecting and utilizing numbers for government purposes (Hacking, 1990) . Numbers equip the modern State with intellectual machinery and "know-how" (Rose and Miller, 1992) 1 , and make it possible for government to act at a distance (Bloomfield, 1991 , Latour, 1987 ). Yet, since the 1970s important changes have taken place in all Western nations, known as the modernization of public sector and the rise of New Public Management (NPM) (Hunter, 1996 , Hood, 1991 . Or, as a former Auditor General of 2 Norway described the changes; from 1970 to 90 " [a] transition similar to an experiment occurred from a fine-tuned focus on details to top-down spending limits, towards a lesser degree of state initiated governing of resources and organization to governing by results" (Mørk-Eidem, 1999: 11) . 2 The situation is now characterized by among other traits an increased use of formal accounts in public services (Lee and Cassell, 2011) , supported by an extended and professionalized number-producing industry for the public government. Briefly put, more numbers circulate in Western state bureaucratic processes than just some decades ago.
Second, the use of numbers in public sector is often characterized by a lack of knowledge about social processes and actors involved in the development of the quantifying tool and organizationally produced numbers. They are blackboxed; treated as if they work "outside social order" (Star and Lampland, 2009: 9) , as if it does not matter whose they are, who has made them, or who knows them (Code, 1995) . But often, it does matter. When used as organizing devices in welfare services, standards, such as accounting numbers and statistical categories, can rule people in or out (i.e. when used to measure individual needs for assistance). They codify, embody and prescribe ethics and values (Star and Lampland, 2009 ).
As an old phrase says, "what's counted counts". Further, calculative practices that build upon the numbers (re-)shape social and economic relations (Miller, 2001) , even as they to some extent reflect past policy. Standards and statistical categories, which are mobilized through quantifying tools, were formally defined through the technology development. In some cases this process take place over several decades with changing policy inspirations.
An implication of the truism as approached through these observations is that there is little control of which and whose ideas, desires and visions that are attempted transformed to public service practice through the quantifying technologies. This article aims to open up the black box of statistics as a technology of government to explore the background of its development -which is not visible in the official presentation of the technology. The article draws on a case study of a statistical information technology, which has been obligatory used in every
Norwegian municipality since 2006, to measure "levels of functioning in daily living and assistance needs of every citizen who applies for or receives help from the municipality's health and care services" (Directorate of Health 2009 ). The technology is called IPLOS, or "Individual-based health and care statistics", and constitutes the national nursing and care 3 statistics in Norway. IPLOS is meant to be used both in planning of the health and care services and in research, and is also used in budgeting by some larger municipalities. The article starts with a modest question: How was the IPLOS technology developed? It then follows the methodological advice formulated and advanced both within sociology of science and technology and recent debates about "governing by numbers": To use technologies as lenses to explore society in the making (Callon, 1987) , or "problematics of government" Miller, 1992, Miller and Rose, 2008) . As Rose and Miller (1992: 183, 175) argue in a Foucauldian frame, it is through governmental technologies, such as statistics, forms, and procedures, which the authorities seek to embody and give effect to governmental ambitions.
This means, through our exploration of the development of the given statistics, we are led to "the historically constituted matrix within which are articulated all those dreams, schemes, strategies and manoeuvres of authorities that seek to shape the beliefs and conduct of others in desired directions by acting upon their will, their circumstances or their environment" (Rose and Miller, 1992: 175) . What have the Norwegian authorities attempted to achieve with the development of IPLOS? Which goals did they desire and how were the statistics intended to contribute to reaching them?
Since quantifying tools and numbers are seldom acknowledged as sociocultural projects, official versions of when public technology development processes started should seldom be taken for granted (Star and Lampland, 2009) , or listened to from only a bottom up or a top down perspective. This analysis explores both these perspectives to the development of the statistics. It starts with the dreams and fears of Norwegian authorities; their health and care policy visions, that called for a standardization and formalization of the municipal health and care services from the 1970s, as documented in reform work. The article argues that the development -from awareness of a need for numbers to govern, to IPLOS as a technological achievement -expresses three interrelated and processual challenges in Norwegian health and care service policy: 1) planning and governance, 2) the growing complexity of the Norwegian welfare state, and 3) changing welfare ideologies.
Research methods and data material
When the Ministry of Health and Care Services (2006) announced the implementation of IPLOS in 2006, the Ministry described it as "an important tool to mapping local and national needs for nursing-and care services", it would increase the knowledge about the services, and 4 it "had been demanded by the municipalities for a long period". The immediate impression of the importance of the system was rapidly counteracted by harsh criticism from interest organizations working for disabled people and service users' rights. For instance, Flaaum (2006), a disability activist, addressing a demonstration in front of the Parliament, proclaimed that the system was a product of "a view of human life" which normalized the acceptance of sorting people out on the basis of their deviations from the norm; therefore, "IPLOS must die!"
According to Clarke (2005) , the missing dimension to understanding such situations is often history, "the raw material" out of which we construct the here and now (Jones, 2005: 165) .
This implies that something interesting could have taken place before the launch of IPLOS in 2006, something of importance for the statistics' development. To gain insight into the assemblage of diverse "forces" that more or less actively could have been involved in the construction of the statistical technology, we adopted a multisite approach inspired by situational analysis during data collection and analyzing. Situational analysis (SA) is developed by Clarke (2005) , and is an attempt to revise classic grounded theory toward new approaches to grounded theorizing that are adjusted for the postmodern turns in social theory and qualitative research. Among other tools, SA addresses the increasing need for multisite research -projects that examine multiple kinds of data from a particular situation of inquiry, as opposed to single-site, intensive, immersed ethnographies or interview studies of the past (Clarke, 2005: 165) . Within a situational analytic frame, the basis for multisite research is to empirically follow the thread of cultural process itself (Marcus, 1995: 97) . Knowledge is not seen as buried, waiting to be uncovered by the researcher. Rather, the researcher is a traveler, who enters conversations, notices sites along the way, and gathers stories and other available "collectibles" (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009: 67) . This has some implications for research practice and the content of the analytic accounts. For instance, the researcher needs a "tracking strategy" during data collection (Marcus, 1995) , analyses will often be based upon a broad data material, and the produced account will contain a high level of details.
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We carefully read the documents with an open mind to what they could tell for a "historicizing" purpose (Clarke, 2005: 264) . We approached the documents as "containers of content" (Prior, 2004) , but with awareness of them being produced in institutional settings for specific purposes. During analysis we have avoided making early analytic commitments and attempted to specify difference and variation of all kinds within the complete data material (Clarke, 2005) . One of the strengths of this as a multi-site study is that we had access both to historical texts and living persons with pertinent knowledge and experiences (Clarke 2005: 267) about the inquired statistics development. This gave us the opportunity to gather several views on "the same" problematics and use them to dig more into the variation of their stories, than we could have done with a single data source from a single point in time. We were also in general aware of the potential bias for interpretation and inference which the order of the reading of texts and transcripts represents. Whose perspective the researcher are introduced to first, may affect which documents or transcripts the researcher chooses to read next and how competing perspectives are interpreted. This challenge confronts all kinds of inference, but in multisite approaches it becomes especially prominent due to the many actors and sites that are represented in the material. To conclude, we do not argue that the "bigger picture" presented in this article is the only possible account of the statistics development and its sociohistorical matrix, but due to our focus on variation, multiple voices and systematic data collection we do claim that this account is to be trusted as one valid possibility.
The need for "chains" to govern life
Over the past decades the art of planning and governing Norwegian health and care services seems to have become more complex practices, both due to sophisticated transformations of the welfare state itself and ideological influences, related to management models and human rights. Norway has been called a reluctant reformist regarding New Public Managementinspired reforms (Christensen and Laegreid, 2007) . However, both the central and local government has gone through numerous small and large changes and reforms, which has led to an increase in elements such as competition, management, market and public choice (i.e. Jacobsen and Mekki, 2012 , Christensen and Laegreid, 2007 , Johnsen, 1999 . A brief map of reforms undertaken from the late 1960s/70s to the launch of IPLOS in 2006 illustrates the intensity of the authorities' work to both respond to challenges confronting their government and to engineer the services in desired directions. The reforms all point in the same direction: A decentralization of formal responsibility for the service users, including a dismantling of centralized institutions, an increasing demand for health professional knowledge in the municipalities, and a strengthening and sophistication of users' rights. Early in the wave the authorities' overarching arguments on the need for reforms were among other tools based upon quantitative and "objective facts" about the development of society in general and the welfare state specifically along with qualitative interpretations of challenges which society and the services confronted due to this development. Demographic numbers and the population's rising income level (NOU, 1972: 44) suggested future capacity problems and resource scarcity due to a larger population and higher demands for and on medical services. Also, experts and authorities documented already existing organizational problems in the services, which biased the future planning. Since experts analytically "drew" the chains, the reforms had to work -as the naturalness of the authorities' way of presenting the chain metaphor suggests. The newly discovered (some might say "invented") connections between the individual service user and his or her environment gave grounds for new approaches to public assistance and care practices. The chain metaphor was also adopted as an organizational dream for future health and care
services. The Norwegian Director General of Health (cited in NOU, 1972: 43) described this as expressed through reform suggestions: "partly already carried out, partly future-orienteddeveloped by experts in this area.
[It] builds on the principle known as 'treatment chain', drawn from preventive, domiciliary activities, through different types of outpatient and institutional kinds of treatment to supportive therapy and follow-up-care". Hence, the chain could be used as a unifying principle across differentiated services, differentiated service user groups, and differentiated disease symptoms. Fragmented collectives of people and activities would be re-connected, and the services -seen as islands in society -would be bridged. From being islands, the services could be pictured as networked. Then, the service user could be managed as a traveler, within a territory consisting of sites and treatments possible to link in different ways. And, as we will see, to exercise health and care for such a user demands user representations that can travel as well, between geographical localizations, services and professional practices: data, documents, numbers.
Call for solidity: Tuning in on statistics
Chains create order. And sometimes, they order orders. Both the differentiation process itself and its remedy, the chain, required a more detailed and broader overview of the services and users. After all, the chain was supposed to intervene in user' lives, through the connections between their bodies, well-being and environment. Yet, in the early 70s' there seemed to be Local politicians focused on details rather than the total picture, ignoring the potential implications of systematization for resource use and needs covering. Service employees did not have time to bother. They were neither in a position to initiate the construction of these required "devices" to cover the needs, nor did they have the competence to manage them.
According to the Ministry of Social Affairs (NOU, 1972: 49-58) this resulted in a situation where information had "less impact on other sectors and in the work with the general plans … for the use of the municipalities' resources and for problem solving in relation to the construction of devices to cover common needs in the municipality. … Planning and administration become increasingly recognized as tasks which demand a special insight". The processing of organizational data for governance purposes had to be delegated to someone or something other than the ordinary employee. And it was best undertaken by a few -not the many, implying a more specified division of labor related to planning and data production work. The municipalities could not be totally blamed. The current situation did not offer them the right tool for the job. Therefore, the Ministry required "necessary data about needs, about the use of existing resources, about access to personnel and so on, through utilizing the possibilities opened by the EDP technique, which will make it reasonably easy to quickly collect such information in the future" (NOU, 1972: 53) . EDP specialists could then take responsibility for data production, regardless of the municipalities' local competences and efforts. 
From local initiatives to a national technology
The tradition for little attention to social planning at the national level and a lack of standards for administrative practice in municipalities led to locally adapted data management traditions. In the early 80s these were mainly of two types: a more or less ad hoc use of numbers to satisfy obligatory reporting requirements to the government and the development of local tools for producing and utilizing data for administrative purposes. The first must have been annoying -if the central authorities discovered it all. The municipalities were annually obliged to submit social services statistics to Statistics Norway,. The aggregated statistics contained, among other information, the number of users in home care and homes for the elderly and total costs in social care (Statistics Norway, 1986 ). According to one informant, "the head of services adjusted the statistics. The number of clients reported was adjusted to the budget in retrospect [...] there was no clear overview of how the care resources were used". The numbers were used as provisional substitutes to link budget and resource use;
typically for planning and strategizing where administrative groups set the parameters for tasks at hand (Lampland, 2010) . Whether they were correct was not important.
Larger municipalities' initiatives to develop local data systems did not pass the eye of the central authorities unnoticed. Their initiatives were taken to express a need for a system on behalf of other municipalities, and local systems could be used as models for a national system. Also, initiatives documented that local data production, more specifically data about service users' function level and level of service, could be connected to budgeting. According to a consultant involved in developing the emerging nursing and care statistics, "clients' function level became more important as a predictor of utilization and costs than for instance age when they connected the data to finances". The budget could then be linked to the number of users and their individual needs. At least one of the municipalities mentioned in a Norwegian study (Nygård and Hansvik, 1986) tried to view these separate data sources as related, resourcing municipalities with a "new" method for budgeting and individual service allocation. Results were increases in productivity and expenditure cuts, as documented by the numbers.
In 1990 the Ministry facilitated the development of an information system available to all municipalities. The scope of this technology signals an ambitious attempt to effectuate governmental plans for the municipalities' management of the services and their way of knowing their service users. Gerix was framed as a lock, to create a statistical realm across the geographical, social, managerial and medical and nursing boundaries of the municipalities, services and service users. Additionally, it was framed as a multi-tool. For instance, during the technical development consultants had many suggestions to which administrative functions the system could be delegated, from being a tool for client assessments, a basis for developing weekly plans for home visits for individual care workers, to collecting user co-payments "and so on" (Holmøy and Heldal, 1994: 15) . At some point the Ministry of Local Government and Labour also considered using Gerix data as the allocative key related to the governmental transfer to the municipalities (Kitterød, 1995) . But to analyze resource use in the nursing and care sector, "data about all users were required" (Kalseth and Magnussen, 1995: 13) , "from all the various types of municipalities" (Kitterød, 1995: 6) -requiring a common level of standardization.
Control health professionals and spread target oriented management
Statistics as a standardization tool was an appealing argument that attracted more stakeholders than management, statisticians and politicians, but related to another challenge: the problem of securing individual users' rights in the services. The committee that evaluated health care for the mentally disabled had depressingly concluded that "there is no automatic control mechanism" for service allocation (NOU, 1985: 27) . At another site, yet echoing the same observation, consultants noted that the different ideologies of professional gatekeepers opposed the standardization of allocation practice -which was a barrier to the statistics and its potential budget function. However, the professionals' ideologies were seen as malleable. A working group involved in the development of Gerix organized what they called "expert panel 13 analyses" to test health professionals' "prioritization behavior and care ideology related to costs" (Devold et al., 1991: 5) : Thus, the analyses are used to build up behavior and ideology dependent cost functions" (Devold et al., 1991: 1) .
The working group aimed for a machine that could mirror society and shape it as well: clean up professional practice, produce a robust relation between service users and budgets, and at a certain level construct one behavior in the municipalities -one ideology. Panel analyses
showed there was cause for optimism about the machine's ability to intervene and initiate such processes: "Participants were very engaged in this process and felt that they benefited from making an evaluation of their own prioritizations and resource dispersal" (Devold et al., 1991: 8) . They concluded that expert panel analyses should be used as a natural part of a running evaluation of care ideology and prioritization in the municipalities and that this could "give the concept of a target oriented management an operative meaning" (Devold et al., 1991: 6) . The suggestion was followed by an enlarged panel seminar in 1992, which confirmed that the participants were "very united" about how different users should be positioned on a care burden scale (Rømo, 1992: 3) .
Later, the impression of unity was questioned. A larger test of Gerix in a bigger sample of municipalities showed variable data quality (Kitterød, 1995: 8) , suggesting that the expert panels' samples of participants differed somewhat from the municipalities "everyday health care worker". Another working group suggested that it was a complex business to explore causes for resource use since this required a model of behavior, but access to a better and broader data source could contribute (Kalseth and Magnussen, 1995) to solving the matter.
The standardization requirement was also counteracted by the argument that quality differences -in contrast to efficiency differences -could be the result of differences in municipal prioritization which the governmental authorities had to accept as long as the 14 services were a municipal responsibility, making it not necessarily a goal in itself to remove all differences (Kalseth and Magnussen, 1995: 55) . Standardization was framed as a choice the authorities could take or not.
Screwing the statistics tighter
As the authorities knew that the overall structure of the local health and care services had changed radically during few years, they wanted to explore the changes' impact upon life in Aftenposten, a national newspaper, framed Gerix as a "failed computer project in elderly care" (Johansen, 1997) . The Ministry of Social and Health Affairs (1997b) speedily answered the newspaper with a press release the same day, defending Gerix as a system which "is well suited as an information and decision support system for municipal nursing and care services.
A [new] system will build on technical solutions developed in the Gerix project, but the information about the individual will be concentrated in few details".
The solution and the promises
The "new" system was IPLOS -a project so similar to Gerix that a consultant said, "one agreed to change name, so that this , it would not be particularly problematic to implement the new system into the municipalities, since they already had a manual or electronic "register" of the service users, which "they necessarily needed to manage the services".
The many promises set tight design parameters. Since it was to be a national system, it had to be useable in every municipality. Also, the data set had to be flexible enough to capture changes in the nursing and care sector: adaptable to future needs and possible to extend with special registrations and surveys if needed. And it had to be possible to group individuals in similar cost groups, in order to ease the introduction of future case-based funding (Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, 2000: 26-27) . The design had also to be seen in relation to possibilities which Gerix and other existing systems gave and be coordinated with this work (Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, 1997a: 47) . The authorities had also in advance decided that the new system should be a mandatory register. The working group ended up discussing especially four questions that were not settled beforehand: Should the data be The association's response reflected its' interpretation of the value of the data for care work.
The working group highlighted that IPLOS data would "not be sufficient as a tool in the municipalities' daily, professional decisions about services (…) nor give sufficient information for municipal administrative procedures and decisions about nursing and care
services" (Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, 2000: 18) . The statistical purpose seemed to take precedence over the municipalities' interests. This discussion was important, as it would settle the detail level of analyses to be done based on the data and hence their managerial and statistical usefulness.
Negotiations, provocations
The detail level that the technology would be allowed to operate on was also relevant for service users and their organizations, and for national privacy rules. Too much scope for action for the municipalities could imply that they would use the tool and the numbers for their own purposes as before, potentially creating ambivalences in the relation between service users and the services' administration. When the system was tested, this happened.
An informant from an interest organization, who observed the working group from the sideline and met IPLOS in action through her own job, recalled that:
"...it was said very clearly that this was not meant to be used at the individual level. It was going to be used as a plan and mapping system for budgeting and… further development of the fields at the national and municipal levels. I remember specifically that some municipalities did not understand that… [Some] started using this new tool related to service applications. I contacted [one of the persons from the working group] and got confirmed that this was not the way the system should be used. I went out and started a dialogue with the chief administrative officer and head of the local social services about them being on the wrong track." (Star & Lampland, 2009) that the authorities attempted to give effect to through the government technology -and the organizations' ideological thoughts were not included in this effort. Rather than accepting IPLOS as the groundbreaking tool for planning and governance of the services, the system turned into a contestation of social values with a gust of distrust.
Conclusion
When we opened the black box of the Norwegian nursing and care statistics from the 1970s, we did not find a streamlined technical innovation process, with a self-evident direction towards IPLOS as the particular end product in 2006. Rather, we found a generation of statistics, and a sociocultural landscape of governmental worries and ambitions, organizational challenges in the municipalities, expert influences upon policy and statistics development, changing knowledge processes, and an assemblage of people from different institutions, related through a common concern for the need for numbers to govern.
The analysis shows that the governmental ideas of using numbers, or at least data and documents, to improve management, budgeting and efficiency were already present in the early preparations for reform of the services from the 70s. The ideological concerns, which drove the request for numbers, came from within the state bureaucracy itself (see also Krause, 2010) . It was fuelled by fears of differentiation processes in society in general, reports of violations of human rights and dignity in the services specifically and dreams for what the welfare state could achieve for its citizens if society and technological development were tamed.
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A key step towards establishing an infrastructure in the health and care services, a step necessary to start thinking about statistics as a feasible project in the first place, was the adoption of the chain metaphor. The services were no longer seen as islands where service users were kept, but as a network with the users traveling along their connections in accordance with their assistance and treatment needs. The idea of the chain seems to have focused the authorities on social planning in the municipalities and on asking what materialities for planning existed at the time. What they found was mess and variation in service administrative practices both between and within the municipalities. The authorities required more systematization and more data, since this diversity biased the systematization of available data about the service users and the municipalities' resource needs and use. It was suggested, not least by consultants who offered to do the job, that devices had to be constructed to solve this situation, as well as an extraction of the responsibility for the local data production and management to specific formal positions, reserved for people or tools with special insights in this work. The authorities asked for a materialization of communication lines along the connections between municipalities, services, people and budgets, through technology and standardizing of administrative practice and planning in the local health and care services. These efforts implied making the diversity manageable, to make the service users and the municipalities resources more "thinkable" for the authorities (Rose and Miller, 1992) . Through "thinkability", as offered through statistical categories, the local calculations of public expenditure and national planning of the services could be rationalized. Central authorities also felt a need for numbers aimed towards controlling the health professionals, their assistants and local administrators who turned claims of assistance needs into budgets. But the authorities also wanted a tool to control their own actions, to screen out feelings of insecurity about whether they took the right decisions on the basis of the right information.
The diversity of municipal practices related to local production and use of data from and about the services was also expressed through a few municipalities' efforts to construct local technologies for managing the data and utilizing them for budgeting -in contrast to other municipalities' that ignored the data. Within the former, assemblages of techniques, experiences (Rose and Miller, 1992) , theories of management and test results emerged, which convinced the central authorities of the potential for using local systems as models for a 20 national information system -first Gerix, then IPLOS. Gerix gave direction for the further development of the nursing and care statistics into IPLOS. It locked up the subsequent development process. What Callon (1991: 149) terms irreversibility emerged. It became impossible to go back to a point where this kind of quantitative tool to govern the services was only one amongst others. The many promises that the authorities launched on behalf of the technology strengthened the irreversibility. Since these numbers could do nearly everything the authorities could ask for, from controlling allocation to calculating budgets and standardizing services, was there any point in looking back?
The composition of interests represented in the IPLOS working group had same effect, which leads us to the close relation between the technology development and changing welfare ideologies. As the analysis has shown, hired consultants attempted to give target-oriented municipal management meaning and form in the early 90s through the technology under construction. Here, the Trojan horse works as a metaphor for how they perceived that this could be effectively done, through writing management ideas into the seemingly neutral statistical categories and rules of use. Yet, when organizations working for the rights of the service users and the disabled confronted the seemingly ahistorical tool which the authorities "suddenly" launched, they acted against it with their own history in mind. The organizations saw IPLOS as a horse which no longer contained the planning and governance ideas of the welfare state from the 70s and 80s -ideas that were woven together with the fight for the rights of the disabled and the normalization of the service users. The numbers visualized a social order in Norwegian health and care policy which the organizations could not recognize as including their ideological project for the welfare state anymore -a project which they had perceived as the welfare state's own.
